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Trump’s	populist	foreign	policy	rhetoric	is	more	about
cultivating	his	base	than	supporting	US	interests
abroad
For	many,	Donald	Trump	has	pursued	a	‘presidency	by	Twitter’,	using	the	social	media	platform	to	set
out	his	views	and	policy	positions	on	a	variety	of	issues.	Jonny	Hall	looks	at	how	Trump’s	Twitter
rhetoric	has	affected	US	overseas	counterterrorism	campaigns.	He	finds	that	Trump’s	words	–
including	his	pivot	from	talking	about	terrorists	to	immigrants	–	have	been	more	to	do	with	creating	fear
about	the	world	to	appeal	to	his	base	rather	than	justifying	significant	changes	to	US	counterterrorism
strategies.
One	of	the	unique	debates	surrounding	the	Donald	Trump	presidency	has	been	the	extent	to	which	analysts	should
focus	on	the	president’s	rhetoric	or	his	administration’s	policies.	Prominent	voices	such	as	former	CIA	Director	and
Afghanistan	commander,	General	David	Petraeus,	for	example,	has	argued	that	we	should	be	following	‘the	troops,
the	money,	and	the	substance	of	policies’	instead	of	being	‘too	mesmerized	by	reading	tweets’	by	Trump.	And	yet,	it
seems	too	extreme	to	simply	ignore	Trump’s	unscripted	remarks	or	tweets	given	their	impact,	especially	in	a
presidency	that	is	probably	more	centred	on	what	the	president	says	than	any	before	it.
How	has	Trump’s	foreign	policy	rhetoric	during	his	presidential	campaign	and	the	first	two	years	of	his	presidency
affected	US	foreign	policy	involving	overseas	counterterrorism	campaigns?	This	area	is	important	to	study	because
of	how	Trump	himself	emphasised	the	issue	of	counterterrorism	in	his	presidential	campaign.	If	there	is	a	link
between	Trump’s	rhetoric	and	government	policy,	this	area	seems	like	a	likely	case.	This	is	especially	so	given	the
extensive	scope	and	costs	of	counterterrorism	campaigns	today,	which	(in	theory	at	least)	have	to	be	justified	to	the
American	electorate.
On	the	purpose	of	foreign	policy	rhetoric	
Conventional	wisdom	on	foreign	policy	rhetoric	assumes	that	it	serves	a	largely	enabling	role	in	generating
necessary	political	and	material	support	for	carrying	out	certain	foreign	policies.	If	there	is	any	divergence	on	this
issue	in	the	field	of	International	Relations,	it	is	largely	about	the	degree	to	which	this	support	can	be	manufactured
or	not.
Similarly,	there	is	a	large	degree	of	consensus	on	the	purpose	of	foreign	policy	rhetoric	during	presidential
campaigns.	When	running	as	a	challenger,	foreign	policy	rhetoric	is	normally	associated	with	criticisms	of	the
incumbent	government	and	proposed	alternative	foreign	policies	to	resolve	these	failures.	In	this	way,	candidates
can	use	their	foreign	policy	rhetoric	to	establish	their	credibility	as	a	future	commander-in-chief	highlight	issues	that
they	care	about	or	contrast	themselves	to	other	candidates.	When	running	for	re-election	as	an	incumbent,	the
president	is	expected	to	effectively	treat	the	election	as	a	referendum	on	their	tenure	to	date,	offering	a	positive
message	by	highlighting	the	foreign	policy	achievements	of	their	administration	and	ignoring	any	unfulfilled
promises.
However,	Trump’s	conduct	runs	at	odds	with	these	conventional	accounts	in	two	ways.	Firstly,	Trump’s	rhetoric
appears	to	be	aimed	towards	polarising	the	electorate,	rather	than	unifying	it	in	support	of	his	foreign	policy
measures.	This	can	likely	be	explained	by	the	fact	that	US	counterterrorism	campaigns	seemingly	no	longer	need	to
be	legitimised,	with	the	electorate	increasingly	being	shielded	from	the	costs	of	war.
Secondly,	Trump’s	re-election	campaign	has	failed	to	try	to	persuade	other	voters	beyond	those	who	elected	him	in
the	first	place.	In	Trump’s	own	words,	‘I	think	my	base	is	so	strong,	I’m	not	sure	I	have	to	do	that’.	Although	Trump’s
re-election	campaign	was	updated	to	‘Keep	America	Great	Again’,	it	is	noticeable	that	the	campaign	has	continued
to	primarily	rely	on	the	themes	of	fear	and	crisis	to	mobilise	support;	as	one	commentator	aptly	summarised,	‘the
familiar	slogan	has	been	updated	…	but	the	tone	of	the	show	has	not’.
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Trump’s	reliance	on	the	themes	of	crisis	can	be	explained	by	scholarship	on	populism,	which	I	define	as	a	form	of
political	rhetoric	that	relies	on	the	theme	of	crisis	to	place	‘the	people’	against	alternative	groups	to	generate
support.	As	Benjamin	Moffitt	in	particular	has	argued,	without	a	sense	of	crisis,	there	is	no	populism.	This	is
because	a	widespread	sense	of	crisis	creates	a	feeling	of	urgency	and	demands	action,	which	populist	politicians
can	thrive	upon.	The	challenge	then,	for	governing	populists,	is	how	to	generate	a	sense	of	crisis	without	bringing
one	own’s	legitimacy	into	question.
“President	Trump	and	the	First	Lady	in	India”	by	The	White	House	is	Public	Domain
The	Trump	administration’s	counterterrorism	policies	and	Trump’s	rhetoric	
On	the	2016	campaign	trail,	Trump	regularly	invoked	themes	of	crisis,	arguing	that	terrorism	(and	particularly	ISIS)
is	‘the	big	threat’	facing	the	world.	Trump	placed	the	blame	for	this	on	the	Obama	administration	(and	thus,	by
extension,	President	Obama’s	Secretary	of	State,	Hillary	Clinton),	even	accusing	the	administration	of	‘actively
supporting	Al	Qaeda	in	Iraq,	the	terrorist	group	that	became	the	Islamic	State’.	Trump	portrayed	terrorists
exclusively	as	Muslim,	logically	culminating	in	his	call	for	a	ban	on	all	Muslims	entering	the	United	States.	Finally,
Trump	promised	to	provide	the	solutions	to	the	issue	of	terrorism,	declaring	that	‘nobody	would	be	together	on	ISIS’
than	himself,	and	claiming	that	he	had	a	‘secret	plan’	to	defeat	the	organisation.
In	the	first	year	of	his	presidency,	Trump	followed	in	the	path	of	his	campaign	by	emphasising	the	threat	of
terrorism,	such	as	his	suggestion	that	the	judge	who	ruled	against	the	implementation	of	Executive	Order	13769
(commonly	known	as	the	‘Muslim	Ban’)	was	allowing	‘very	bad	and	dangerous	people’	into	the	US,	thus	placing	the
‘country	in	such	peril’.	The	next	day,	Trump	alleged	that	‘all	over	Europe’,	terrorist	attacks	were	occurring	but	that
‘the	very,	very	dishonest	press	doesn’t	want	to	report	it’,	fulfilling	the	conspiratorial	tendencies	of	populism	and
crisis	rhetoric.
In	terms	of	policy,	Trump	repeatedly	overexaggerated	the	effects	of	his	presidency.	With	regards	to	ISIS,	Trump
claimed	that	‘we’ve	taken	back	almost	100	percent	…	of	the	land’	previously	held	by	the	group,	and	that	this	‘all
took	place’	during	his	presidency.	Furthermore,	Trump	located	himself	as	the	cause	for	this,	stating	in	one	instance
that	ISIS	fighters	were	‘now	giving	up	…	raising	their	hands	…	walking	off’	and	that	‘nobody	has	ever	seen	that
before	…	because	you	didn’t	have	Trump	as	your	president’.
However,	as	has	been	noted	elsewhere,	there	were	no	significant	changes	in	the	counter-ISIS	campaign,	with
policy	being	largely	a	continuation	of	the	Obama	administration’s	campaign	led	by	the	same	key	personnel.	What’s
more,	where	the	Trump	administration	has	made	changes	in	terms	of	its	counterterrorism	strategy,	they	have	often
been	without	much	fanfare.	This	disconnect	between	rhetoric	and	policy	comes	back	to	the	purpose	of	Trump’s
foreign	policy	rhetoric,	which	is	less	concerned	with	generating	support	for	these	day-to-day	operations,	and	more
with	using	foreign	policy	rhetoric	as	a	way	of	appealing	specifically	to	his	domestic	base.
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Changing	targets	in	Trump’s	rhetoric	
Although	there	had	always	been	conflation	in	Trump’s	rhetoric	between	terrorists	and	immigrants,	there	was	a
noticeable	shift	in	the	lead	up	to	the	November	2018	midterm	elections	with	the	identification	of	immigrants	as	the
primary	threat	to	the	homeland,	which	coincided	with	the	territorial	defeat	of	ISIS	and	the	decline	in	ISIS-inspired
attacks	in	the	West.	Trump	described	the	migrant	caravan	from	Central	America	as	an	‘invasion’	of	the	US,	claimed
that	the	caravan	had	‘criminals	and	unknown	Middle	Easterners	…	mixed	in’,	and	suggested	that	the	Democrats
‘had	something	to	do’	with	the	formation	of	the	caravan	for	their	own	political	purpose.	No	convincing	evidence	was
presented	for	any	of	these	assertions,	but	the	political	logic	was	clear,	with	75	percent	of	Republicans	in	considering
illegal	immigration	a	‘very	big’	problem	for	the	US,	and	just	19	percent	of	Democrats	thinking	the	same.
Furthermore,	although	this	shift	in	Trump’s	rhetoric	initially	coincided	with	the	midterm	elections,	it	continued	after
them.	In	both	December	2018	and	January	2019,	there	were	more	than	90	tweets	by	Trump	including	the	phrases
‘border	security’,	‘open	border’,	‘illegal	immigrant’,	‘immigrant’,	‘immigration’,	and	‘MS-13’	as	his	administration
attempted	to	convince	the	public	that	the	US	was	‘in	the	midst	of	a	crisis	at	our	southern	border’.	In	February	2019,
following	a	federal	government	shutdown,	Trump	then	declared	a	state	of	national	emergency	to	increase	funding
for	his	administration’s	southern	border	wall,	using	similarly	dubious	claims	of	crisis	to	justify	this	position.	The
disputed	nature	of	Trump’s	allegations	can	be	seen	in	the	rejection	of	the	national	emergency	in	the	House	and
Senate,	but	again,	73	percent	of	Republican	voters	supported	Trump’s	declaration,	allowing	him	to	present	himself
as	their	true	representative.
Since	he	was	elected,	the	target	of	Trump’s	foreign	policy	rhetoric	has	changed	from	terrorists	to	immigrants,	and
this	relates	back	to	the	fundamental	purpose	of	populist	rhetoric	and	the	need	to	continually	perpetuate	a	sense	of
crisis,	rather	than	to	generate	support	for	policies	or	celebrate	policy	success.	Although	this	particular	case	may	be
unique	to	Trump,	it	could	well	be	that	this	mode	of	changing	targets	–	especially	by	targeting	different	external
groups	–	is	something	that	we	can	recognise	elsewhere.
This	article	is	based	on	the	paper,	‘In	search	of	enemies:	Donald	Trump’s	populist	foreign	policy	rhetoric’
published	in	Politics,	as	part	of	the	special	issue	‘Elections,	Rhetoric	and	American	Foreign	Policy	in	the	Age
of	Donald	Trump’	(10.1177/0263395720935376)	
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